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Examining the Complications 
of Global Energy Governance
Benjamin K Sovacool and Ann Florini*
This article systematically examines fundamental obstacles to effective 
and efficient global energy governance. The first part of the article 
defines and conceptualises governance, global governance and 
global energy governance. It also explores the existing global energy 
governance architecture, depicting six types of global energy governor 
– intergovernmental organisations, summit processes, international non-
governmental organisations, multilateral financial institutions, regional 
organisations that involve two or more countries as members and hybrid 
entities – and a sample of 42 such institutions and organisations currently 
operating around the world. The second part of the article corrects some 
emerging misconceptions about global energy governance: that effective 
forms of governance are likely to occur because they have net benefits; that 
Western forms of energy governance can be transplanted to the rest of the 
world; and that regional energy governance is in some ways preferable to 
global energy governance. The article concludes that more nuanced and 
careful assessment will be needed, and misconceptions abandoned, if we 
are truly to respond to the governance issues induced by deteriorating 
energy security and growing emissions of greenhouse gases.
In his famous book Slaughterhouse-Five, Kurt Vonnegut asks readers to 
imagine what the firebombing of Dresden, Germany, during the Second 
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World War would have looked like in reverse.1 American bombers, full of 
holes and wounded men, would have taken off backwards from airfields in 
England. German fighter planes would have sucked bullets and shells out 
of the aircraft over France. The bombers themselves would have opened 
their doors and ‘exerted a miraculous magnetism’ to shrink flames, restore 
buildings, and bring the dead back to life. What amazing machines, 
Vonnegut mused, the tools of war would be if they instead did the opposite.
The same could be said about the existing technologies that emit 
greenhouse gases into our atmosphere. What a wonderful sight it would 
be to witness factories, power plants, refineries and vehicle exhaust systems 
sucking emissions right out of the air. Engineers and scientists would be 
standing by to transform them into easily stored and transported tonnes of 
coal, cubic feet of natural gas and barrels of oil. Coal miners and petroleum 
geologists would rush to place the carbon-intensive fuels back deep into the 
earth where they would no longer harm our atmosphere. In essence, our 
technology would be geared towards doing exactly what nature has done 
over millions of years to keep our climate stable.
The above example dramatises the types of technological systems we would 
need to create a more sustainable energy future, but of course the problem 
is that they do not yet (and may never) exist. Although much of the current 
climate and energy debate still assumes that we can tinker our way out of the 
problem, we argue that policy-makers and individuals need to be thinking 
about how they can effectively govern our way out of it. Effective forms of energy 
governance – how the rules concerning energy production and use are set and 
enforced – are an essential part of the transition to low-carbon economies.2
This article systematically examines fundamental obstacles to effective 
and efficient global energy governance. The first part of the article 
defines and conceptualises governance, global governance and global 
energy governance. It also explores the existing global energy governance 
architecture, depicting six types of global energy governor and a sample of 
42 such institutions and organisations currently operating around the world. 
The second part of the article corrects three emerging misconceptions 
about global energy governance:
•	 that	effective	forms	of	governance	are	likely	to	occur	because	they	have	
net benefits;
•	 that	Western	forms	of	energy	governance	can	be	transplanted	to	the	rest	
of the world; and
•	 that	regional	energy	governance	is	preferable	to	global	energy	governance.
1 Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse-Five, or the Children’s Crusade; A Duty-Dance with Death 
(Doubleday Press, 1966).
2 Ann Florini and Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘Who Governs Energy? The Challenges Facing 
Global Energy Governance’ (2009) 37(12) Energy Policy 5239–5248.
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Global energy governance and governors
The term ‘energy governance’ has gained popularity in recent years, 
owing perhaps in part to the pressing nature of global energy problems 
as well as the promise that new actors such as corporations and members 
of civil society hold in addressing gaps between national energy policies 
and strategies. A cursory literature review undertaken in January 2010 on 
four academic databases – LexisNexis, ScienceDirect, JSTOR and ESBCO 
Host – revealed no fewer than 1,173 articles using the term ‘energy 
governance’ in their title or abstract in the past five years. But what does 
the phrase really mean?
It is best to begin with ‘governance’. Table 1 suggests that governance 
in its most basic sense refers to the processes, systems and actors involved 
in addressing collective problems that individuals and markets cannot 
solve for themselves, as well as making and enforcing rules.3 The classic 
provider of governance is government, which has systems to make rules 
and coercive power to back them up. But the private sector, civil society, 
financial institutions and a variety of other organisations can offer 
governance as well, such as the World Bank setting conditions on the 
loans that they give to developing countries or companies undertaking 
corporate social responsibility programmes. When applied to energy, 
such a definition implies that energy governance encompasses rule-
making and enforcement that aims to overcome the collective action 
problems related to energy supply and use. It involves the processes 
of agenda-setting, negotiation, implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement of rules and agreements related to energy, as well as the 
actors connected to energy including governments, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), civil society groups, corporations, citizens, 
public–private partnerships (PPPs) and ordinary consumers. Each of 
these, like other forms of governance, can also differ by scale, from the 
individual or the household to the local, state or provincial level, or 
extending even further to the national and global level. Thus, global 
energy governance refers to the rules and actors related to energy that 
cross national borders.
3 Ann Florini, The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World (Brookings 
Institution, 2005).
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Table 1: Conceptualising governance, global governance and 
global energy governance
Term Definition 
Governance Any and all of the myriad ways in 
which groups of people attempt to 
solve collective action problems, deal 
with market failures and ensure the 
provision of public goods
Global governance Efforts to deal with the wide range 
of border-crossing issues involving 
multiple states and other actors from 
multiple parts of the world
Global energy governance Making and enforcing rules to avoid 
the collective action problems related 
to energy at a scale beyond the nation-
state
Like the concept of global environmental governance,4 the concept of global 
energy governance can be used to offer different types of insight for scholarly 
research on energy and climate. It can represent an analytical tool to make 
sense of current socio-political configurations and transformations in the energy 
sector, especially the shift from classic nation-centred governance structures to 
the more complicated, multilayered and non-hierarchical structures espoused by 
private actors. It can represent a critical concept that challenges the inadequacies 
of national approaches to addressing key energy problems, a sort of political 
programme to redirect problem-solving agendas. It can represent a broadening 
of responsibilities of existing governments as they expand into new areas or 
attempt to reclaim some of their former sovereignty on energy issues. And, global 
energy governance can describe the property of a system, something that can 
be measured and described, its causes and effects evaluated.
A key component of global energy governance, naturally, is the actors that 
play roles in agenda-setting and rule-making – the governors. Six types of global 
energy governor appear most prominent today. The first is intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs), created and funded by national governments, which have 
secretariats that answer to some governing body, such as the International Energy 
Agency. The second is summit processes that offer a sort of ‘halfway house’ 
between formal IGOs and the normal practices of diplomacy between national 
governments; these typically have no charter, fixed membership or secretariat, 
but offer a flexible way to address pressing multilateral problems. The third is 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), not confined to any 
particular country or summit process, which usually have boards and receive 
funding from both the public and the private sector. The fourth is multilateral 
financial institutions (MFIs), predominantly the development banks, which 
4 Frank Biermann and Philipp Pattberg, ‘Global Environmental Governance: Taking Stock, 
Moving Forward’ (2008) 33 Annual Review of Environment and Natural Resources 277–294.
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provide economic and technical assistance to national governments and offer 
loans for energy projects. The fifth is regional organisations that involve two or 
more countries as members that attempt to tackle energy issues in a particular 
segment of the world. The sixth is hybrid entities including everything from 
transnational networks of advocacy to quasi-regulatory private bodies, global 
policy networks and PPPs that may weave some of the previous five types of 
governor together and may also include private sector entities. Note that we 
have excluded transnational corporations as global governors unless they form 
partnerships or networks with other actors. Even though they have long been 
key players in the oil and gas sectors and liberalised electricity markets, along 
with national and state ministries and government regulators, their influence 
is often indirect and global governance concerns are secondary to profits and 
national policy.
To provide a rough map of the global energy governance architecture, Table 
2 depicts no less than 50 global energy governors at work in early 2012. Table 
2 includes 12 IGOs, two summit processes, three INGOs dedicated exclusively 
to energy, six MFIs, seven regional organisations and 20 hybrids. The list is not 
meant to be exhaustive, only indicative of many of the major actors currently 
involved in the global energy governance scene.
Table 2: Fifty global energy governors5
Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
United Nations 
System
UN IGO 1945 for 
core UN. 
Specialised 
agencies 
created 
in various 
years
New York, 
US; Vienna, 
Austria; 
Geneva, 
Switzerland
Building 
international 
peace and 
security as well as 
promoting social 
progress, better 
living standards 
and human rights
Both core UN 
bodies (United 
Nations Environment 
Programme, United 
Nations Development 
Programme) and loosely 
affiliated specialised 
agencies (Food and 
Agricultural Organization; 
International Atomic 
Energy Agency) work on 
various energy issues. 
The newly formed 
umbrella UN Energy is 
intended to coordinate 
their efforts
5 Sources: Achim Steiner, Thomas Wälde, Adrian Bradbrook and Frederik Schutyser, 
‘International Institutional Arrangements in Support of Renewable Energy’ in Dirk Abmann, 
Ulrich Laumanns and Dieter Uh (eds), Renewable Energy: A Global Review of Technologies, 
Policies, and Markets (London: Earthscan, 2006), 152–165; John Kessels, Stefan Bakker 
and Bas Wetzelaer, Energy Security and the Role of Coal (IEA Clean Coal Centre CCC/131, 
2008); Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte, ‘Back to the Future or Forward to the 
Past? Strengthening Markets and Rules for Effective Global Energy Governance’ (2009) 
85(2) International Affairs 373–390; Florini, note 3 above; various institutional websites.
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Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
Global 
Environment 
Facility
GEF IGO 1991 Washington 
DC, US
As the world’s 
largest public 
environment 
fund, GEF 
sponsors 
environmental 
projects, 
through grants 
to developing 
countries, for 
biodiversity, 
climate change, 
international 
waters, 
deforestation, 
and biodiversity 
loss. GEF 
was made 
independent of 
the World Bank 
in 1994
GEF is the entrusted 
financier for projects 
for the United Nations 
Framework Convention 
on Climate Change as 
well as several other 
international conventions 
relating to energy. It has 
so far allocated almost 
US$9bn in funds including 
US$40m as part of a Least 
Developed Countries 
Fund for Climate Change 
and the Special Climate 
Change Fund
International 
Energy Agency
IEA IGO 1974 Paris, France To establish a 
reporting system 
on oil prices 
and create an 
emergency oil-
sharing system, 
and to serve as a 
key information 
source on energy
IEA has been relatively 
successful at coordinating 
national action among 
oil-consuming countries, 
although membership 
excludes such key oil 
consumers as China and 
India. It is the primary 
producer of global 
energy statistics and 
is moving to address 
broader energy and 
climate topics
Organización 
Latinoamericana 
de Energía
OLADE IGO 1973 Quito, 
Ecuador
Developing 
energy security 
and sustainable 
development for 
South America, 
Central America 
and the Caribbean 
Initially conceived as a 
platform for encouraging 
energy integration and 
created by the Lima 
Agreement, OLADE 
now manages a number 
of projects related 
to renewable energy 
and energy efficiency 
planning, capacity-
building and training, 
information systems and 
electricity development
Energy Charter 
Conference 
Treaty
ECT IGO 1991 Brussels, 
Belgium
Places an 
obligation on 
its 51 current 
members to 
facilitate safe 
transit of energy 
fuels across 
territories, 
with the aim 
of creating a 
transparent and 
efficient energy 
market 
Offers dispute settlement 
over energy transit 
related issues, seeks 
to protect European 
foreign investments in 
energy and promotes 
free-flowing trade of 
energy commodities. 
ECT was intended to set 
clear rules governing 
cross-border transit of oil 
and gas via pipelines, but 
Russia, a key player, has 
announced it will not join
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Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
Organisation for 
Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development
OECD IGO 1961 Paris, France Strives to promote 
democracy 
and economic 
growth through 
employment, 
raised living 
standards, 
financial stability 
and trade among 
its 30 country 
members
OECD manages 
the Nuclear Energy 
Agency, which explores 
the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy through 
international cooperation 
to develop the scientific, 
legal and technological 
basis for nuclear fission
International 
Renewable 
Energy Agency 
IRENA IGO 2009 Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Charged with 
promoting 
renewable energy 
among its 142 
member countries
Although only about 
one year old, IRENA 
has already begun 
developing a knowledge 
base of best practices 
for renewable energy 
promotion, providing 
policy advice, facilitating 
technology transfer and 
financing and stimulating 
research on all aspects of 
renewable energy
Generation IV 
International 
Forum
GIF IGO 2001 Paris, France To establish the 
feasibility and 
performance 
capabilities of the 
next generation 
of nuclear energy 
systems
Comprising Argentina, 
Brazil, Canada, France, 
Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, the Republic of 
South Africa, the United 
Kingdom and the United 
States, GIF is committed 
to promoting the global 
development and use of 
advanced nuclear power 
technologies including 
thermal and fast neutron 
spectra reactors, closed 
and open fuel cycles and 
a wide range of reactor 
sizes from very small 
to very large. GIF aims 
to commercialise these 
systems by 2015 to 2030
Organization of 
the Petroleum 
Exporting 
Countries
OPEC IGO 1960 Vienna, 
Austria
Initially created 
at the Baghdad 
Conference in 
1960 by Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela, OPEC 
has since grown 
to 12 major 
oil-exporting 
countries that 
vow to ‘stabilise 
oil prices’ by 
matching 
expected demand 
to oil production
OPEC member 
countries coordinate 
their production and 
refining of oil to ensure 
the best return on 
their investments, 
with ministers meeting 
twice a year to review 
production quotas, 
reserve to production 
ratios and market trends 
for petroleum
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Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum
GECF IGO 2001 Doha, Qatar Founded by 
some of the 
leading natural 
gas producers 
to represent and 
support their 
mutual interests
Members control 73 
per cent of gas reserves 
and 41 per cent of 
current production, and 
membership consists of 
Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, 
Oman, Qatar, Russia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, 
United Arab Emirates 
and Venezuela, with 
Norway participating as 
an observer
International 
Energy Forum
IEF IGO 1991/2002 Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia
Although its first 
summit was held 
in 1991 hosted 
by France and 
Venezuela, its 
formal secretariat 
was established 
following 
the Osaka 
Announcement 
in 2002. IEF 
is the world’s 
largest recurring 
gathering of 
energy ministers
Holds forums designed 
to focus attention on key 
global energy issues and 
also coordinates the Joint 
Oil Data Initiative along 
with efforts from other 
organisations such as 
APEC, IEA, OLADE and 
OPEC
International 
Partnership for 
the Hydrogen 
Economy
IPHE IGO 2003 Berlin, 
Germany
To foster 
international 
cooperation in 
hydrogen and 
fuel cells and 
seek to organise 
demonstration 
and 
commercialisation 
of hydrogen 
technologies 
Establishes common 
codes and standards 
conducive to the global 
adoption of hydrogen 
systems through its 17 
member countries
Group of Eight G8 Summit Process 1975/1997 Rotating 
meetings 
hosted in 
turn by 
member 
states
To provide an 
informal and 
small forum for 
government 
leaders to 
discuss policy 
coordination
Emerged in the mid-
1970s in response to 
dislocations from oil price 
shocks. Until recently 
its attention to energy 
waxed and waned 
with the price of oil. 
Beginning with its 2005 
summit, much attention 
is now given to climate 
change
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Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
Summit of the 
Americas
-– Summit Process 1994 Washington 
DC, US
Organisation of 
North, South and 
Central America 
countries that 
discusses a wide 
range of issues 
of common 
regional interest 
including illegal 
narcotics, security, 
immigration, trade 
and energy
The second summit 
held in Santiago, Chile 
in 1998 called for 
energy integration and 
sustainable development 
in the region through 
harmonisation of fiscal 
and legal policies and 
processes
World Energy 
Council
WEC INGO 1923 London, UK Charged with 
promoting 
sustainable 
energy, through 
research and 
analysis, energy 
projections, and 
recommendations 
in 93 countries
Produces publications, 
hosts conferences and 
arranges meetings 
covering all major energy 
sources as well as a 
World Energy Conference 
once every three years
World Council 
for Renewable 
Energies
WCRE INGO 2001 Bonn, 
Germany
Promotes 
renewable 
energy through 
information, 
agenda-setting 
and networking
A precursor to IRENA, 
WCRE still plays a 
role providing analysis 
on the international 
barriers to renewable 
energy, providing advice 
on renewable energy 
targets, evaluating 
the performance of 
commercially available 
technologies and 
identifying best practices 
in renewable energy 
promotion
Global Energy 
Network 
Institute
GENI INGO 1991 San Diego, 
California, 
US
Dedicated to 
promoting the 
interconnection of 
national electric 
power networks 
so that renewable 
energy resources 
can be integrated 
on a regional and 
global scale
Focuses on raising 
awareness about the 
benefits of high-voltage, 
interconnected electricity 
transmission networks 
through research, 
including electric power 
maps, simulations and 
visualisations developed 
in partnership with 
the World Resources 
Simulation Center
Asian 
Development 
Bank
ADB MFI 1966 Manila, 
Philippines
To facilitate 
economic 
development 
and reduce 
poverty among its 
member countries
ADB has provided billions 
of dollars of energy 
infrastructure lending 
and restructured energy 
and electricity markets. 
Historically, ADB has 
invested in capital-
intensive technologies 
and fossil fuels, but there 
is some evidence of a 
shift now in priorities to 
renewable energy and 
energy efficiency
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Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
World Bank 
Group
WBG MFI 1944 Washington 
DC, US
Umbrella 
organisation, 
consisting of the 
International Bank 
for Reconstruction 
and Development, 
the International 
Development 
Association, the 
International 
Finance 
Corporation, 
the Multilateral 
Investment 
Guarantee 
Agency and the 
International 
Centre for 
Settlement of 
Investment 
Disputes, which 
funds and 
provides technical 
expertise to 
development 
projects (wide-
ranging) in 
developing 
countries aimed at 
fighting poverty 
and promoting 
foreign direct 
investment
Much larger than 
the other multilateral 
developments, WBG 
offers billions of dollars 
of loans each year for 
energy development, 
mostly in conventional 
(and fossil-fuelled) 
infrastructure. The World 
Bank is looking into how 
to improve access for 
developing countries, in 
a sustainable way
European 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development
EBRD MFI 1991 London, UK Supports projects 
in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
by investing in 
private sector 
clients and 
encouraging 
free market 
mechanisms
Provides loans 
for conventional 
infrastructure and 
electricity networks 
and also launched the 
Sustainable Energy 
Initiative in 2006, with 
a key focus on investing 
about €6bn in energy 
efficiency and cleaner 
forms of energy supply
African 
Development 
Bank
AfDB MFI 1964 Abidjan, 
Côte d’Ivoire
Invests in poverty 
reduction and 
sustainable 
development 
projects in its 
regional member 
countries
Focused mostly on 
energy development and 
power sector reform, 
enhancing export 
opportunities for its 
members and increasing 
equitable access to 
energy services
Inter-American 
Development 
Bank
IDB MFI 1959 Washington 
DC, US
The multilateral 
development bank 
for Latin America 
and the Caribbean
Aims to promote regional 
energy integration and 
investments in energy 
infrastructure, also 
launched a Sustainable 
Energy and Climate 
Change Initiative in 2008 
to offer US$1bn in loans 
for energy efficiency, 
renewable electricity and 
biofuels
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Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
International 
Fund for 
Agricultural 
Development
IFAD MFI 1977 Rome, Italy Combats rural 
hunger and 
poverty in 
developing 
countries through 
low-interest 
loans and direct 
assistance
Works with the rural 
poor, governments, 
donors and NGOs to 
improve rural access to 
biogas and solar home 
system units, and to 
reduce drudgery and 
‘lighten the load’ for 
rural women
Association of 
Southeast Asian 
Nations
ASEAN Regional 
Organisation
1967 Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
Aims to unify the 
geopolitical region 
of South-East Asia 
and encourage 
economic growth, 
social progress, 
political stability 
and peace
Manages several energy 
centres and ministerial 
meetings including a 
Council on Petroleum 
and an Energy Research 
Centre and often brokers 
bilateral and multilateral 
agreements between 
its members and also 
between Southeast 
Asia and major energy 
exporters and importers
European Union EU Regional 
Organisation
1993 Brussels, 
Belgium
Responsible 
for promoting 
European 
economic 
and political 
integration and 
establishing a 
common market 
for trade and 
exchange 
Promotes interconnected 
markets for energy 
among its members and 
abroad, strategic energy 
stockpiling and robust 
emissions reduction 
targets and national 
targets for renewable 
energy
Organization of 
the Black Sea 
Economic
Cooperation
BSEC Regional 
Organisation
1992 Istanbul, 
Turkey
Encourages 
economic 
and political 
interaction and 
harmony between 
its 11 member 
states around the 
Black Sea, with 
observer status 
given to several 
other countries 
including the 
United States
Their plan of action 
on energy consists 
in ensuring energy 
security for each other, 
integration of an 
energy market through 
harmonising legislation, 
adopting best practices in 
environmental standards, 
research, demonstration 
and investment in energy 
efficiency, developing 
renewable energy and 
micro-generation, and 
promoting regional 
energy exports globally
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Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
Shanghai 
Cooperation 
Organization
SCO Regional 
Organisation
2001 Beijing, 
China
Formerly the 
Shanghai 
Five (China, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Tajikistan), 
SCO was created 
after Uzbekistan 
was added 
and India, Iran, 
Mongolia and 
Pakistan were 
offered observer 
status. Its primary 
function is to 
address security-
related concerns, 
including terrorism
Member states have 
agreed on an ‘energy 
action plan’ to unlock the 
hydrocarbon resources 
of the Caspian Sea, 
establish a unified market 
for oil and gas exports 
and promote preferential 
bilateral production-
sharing agreements
Southern African 
Development 
Community
SADC Regional 
Organisation
1992 Gaborone, 
Botswana
Its 14 member 
states aim to 
develop regional 
economies, 
reduce poverty 
and harmonise 
economy and 
trade policies, 
and have reduced 
internal trade 
barriers and are 
working towards 
a single currency
The organisation 
actively promotes large-
scale electricity and 
transmission projects 
such as the Southern 
African Power Plant 
Western Corridor 
Transmission Project and 
other regional electricity 
interconnections as well 
as a regional petroleum 
and gas association 
between Angola, 
Botswana and the 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo and coordinated 
rural energy planning
Asia-Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation
APEC Regional 
Organisation
1989 Singapore A non-binding 
intergovernmental 
group of 21 
economies, 
including all 
Asian majors, 
whose primary 
focus is to reduce 
trade barriers 
and improve 
investments and 
exports among 
members
The organisation set 
up the energy security 
initiative in 2000, which 
includes data-sharing 
and the Joint Oil Data 
Initiative to counter 
supply disruptions. Its 
Sydney Declaration 
in 2007 focused on 
climate change and 
energy security. Its action 
agenda includes several 
goals such as improving 
energy efficiency, 
increasing forest cover 
and strengthening 
low-carbon energy 
technology
South Asian 
Association 
for Regional 
Cooperation
SAARC Regional 
Organisation
1985 Kathmandu, 
Nepal
To facilitate trade 
and regional 
cooperation 
between 
Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, 
the Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka.
Committed to a number 
of energy-related goals, 
including strengthening 
South Asia’s capacity to 
address energy problems, 
enhancing energy trade, 
establishing regional 
electricity grids and 
natural gas pipelines, and 
encouraging investments 
in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency 
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Institution Acronym Form of 
global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
Central Asia 
Regional 
Economic 
Cooperation
CAREC PPP/Hybrid 1997 Manila, 
Philippines
A unique 
consortium 
funded by 
eight national 
governments and 
six multilateral 
organisations 
(including ADB 
and WBG) 
dedicated to 
reducing poverty 
and improving 
infrastructure 
development
Mobilises about 
US$2.4bn in capital each 
year to be invested in 
roads, transport, water 
and electricity
Renewable 
Energy and 
Energy Efficiency 
Partnership
REEEP PPP/Hybrid 2002 Vienna, 
Austria
To reduce 
greenhouse 
gas emissions, 
improve access to 
reliable and clean 
forms of energy 
in developing 
countries and 
promote energy 
efficiency
Has formed partnerships 
with more than 120 
governments, banks, 
businesses, NGOs and 
IGOs and invested 
€16.4m in more than 
145 projects. However, 
REEEP implements only 
small-scale projects 
and lack of permanent 
funding forces the 
agency to focus on the 
short term
Global Network 
on Energy for 
Sustainable 
Development
GNESD PPP/Hybrid 2002 Roskilde, 
Denmark
To serve as a 
knowledge 
network of 
developing 
world centres 
of excellence 
and network 
partners whose 
main objective 
is to reach the 
UN’s Millennium 
Development 
Goals
Oriented to address 
energy access issues 
and promote renewable 
energy technologies that 
reduce poverty. Mainly 
conducts workshops 
and publishes reports 
on energy and poverty 
in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America
International 
Network on 
Gender and 
Sustainable 
Energy
ENERGIA PPP/Hybrid 1996 Leusden, the 
Netherlands
Informal 
international 
network working 
on gender and 
sustainability 
issues. Modus 
operandi is 
regionalisation of 
activities through 
networks 
Focused entirely on 
empowering rural 
and urban women 
through the use of 
energy. ENERGIA offers 
three types of primary 
assistance around the 
world: placing gender 
and energy issues 
on the international 
agenda for countries 
and development 
institutions (including 
national gender audits), 
building capacity on 
gender integration and 
energy through training 
materials and workshops 
and conducting research 
and analysis on case 
studies and the gendered 
impacts of energy 
production and use
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global 
governance 
Date of 
creation
Central 
location
Primary function Description
Appropriate 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Group
AIDG PPP/Hybrid 2005 Boston, US To improve access 
to electricity, 
sanitation and 
drinking water
Provides business 
incubation loans 
between US$10,000 
and US$100,000 
aimed at procuring 
energy equipment and 
technology, providing 
education and training 
on energy use, and 
serving as seed money 
for energy start-up 
companies
International 
Network for 
Sustainable 
Energy
INFORSE PPP/Hybrid 1992 Hjortshøj, 
Denmark
Established as 
part of the Rio 
Convention, 
INFORSE 
represents a 
network of 140 
NGOs operating 
in 60 countries 
and is funded by 
a mix of national 
governments, 
multilateral 
institutions and 
civil society 
organisations. 
The organisation 
is dedicated 
to promoting 
sustainable 
energy and social 
development
Focuses on four areas: 
raising awareness about 
sustainable energy use; 
promoting institutional 
reform among national 
governments; building 
local and national 
capacity on energy 
related issues; and 
supporting research and 
development
World Business 
Council on 
Sustainable 
Development
WBCSD PPP/Hybrid 1995 Geneva, 
Switzerland
Also founded 
at the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit, 
WBCSD is a 
global association 
of some 200 
companies 
and 55 partner 
and regional 
organisations 
dealing with 
business and 
sustainable 
development 
that sees its 
primary function 
as advocating for 
businesses and 
influencing policy
Aims to create a platform 
for companies to explore 
sustainable development 
best practices, share 
knowledge, and advocate 
business positions. Also 
manages a variety of 
business-sponsored 
projects including energy 
efficiency in buildings, 
water, cement, electricity 
supply, forest products, 
mining and minerals and 
tyres
Collaborative 
Labeling and 
Appliance 
Standards 
Program 
CLASP PPP/Hybrid 1999 Washington 
DC, US
To foster 
economic 
development, 
stimulate global 
trade and 
alleviate poverty 
through the use 
of standards and 
labels
Funded by a variety of 
organisations including 
the US Government, 
WBG and UN, CLASP 
assists with the 
implementation of 
various standards and 
labels relating to energy 
and energy efficiency 
technologies and services
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Efficient Energy 
for Sustainable 
Development 
Partnership 
EESD PPP/Hybrid 2002 Washington 
DC, US
Launched as 
part of the 
World Summit 
on Sustainable 
Development 
by the US 
Department of 
Energy, EESD 
intends to improve 
the productivity 
and efficiency of 
energy systems. Its 
partners include 
businesses, 
NGOs, academia 
and financial 
institutions
Focused on increasing 
overall energy efficiency 
by ten per cent or more 
in 20 countries by 2012
Global Village 
Energy 
Partnership
GVEP PPP/Hybrid 2005 London, UK Seeks to reduce 
poverty through 
accelerated access 
to modern energy 
services through 
its 2,000-plus 
members, which 
include a mix of 
private companies, 
national 
governments, 
development 
agencies, MFIs 
and universities
Committed to forming 
partnerships from 
the bottom up at 
the community and 
municipal levels to 
increase energy access 
and also build capacity to 
adapt to climate change
International 
Institute 
for Energy 
Conservation 
IIEC PPP/Hybrid 1984 Vienna, 
Virginia, US
To assist both 
the public and 
private sectors 
in implementing 
energy efficiency, 
transport and 
environmental 
policies. Funded 
by community 
groups, national 
governments and 
members of civil 
society
Conducts work 
on standards and 
labels, demand-side 
management, climate 
change mitigation and 
adaptation, transport 
planning, energy 
efficiency and pollution 
prevention, renewable 
energy and water
Partnership for 
Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles
PCFV PPP/Hybrid 2002 Nairobi, 
Kenya
To reduce 
vehicular air 
pollution in 
developing 
countries
Has 90 partners 
including governments, 
industry members and 
universities, and primarily 
promotes lead-free, low-
sulphur fuels and cleaner 
vehicle standards and 
technologies, including 
cleaner diesel in Pakistan 
and ‘eco driving’ courses 
in Latin America
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Clinton Climate 
Initiative
CCI PPP/Hybrid 2006 New York, 
NY, US
Part of the 
William J Clinton 
Foundation, 
CCI manages 
an extensive 
programme 
to undertake 
building retrofits, 
improve outdoor 
lighting, reduce 
waste, measure 
greenhouse 
gas emissions, 
encourage 
non-motorised 
transport 
and promote 
‘climate positive’ 
communities 
in major cities, 
conducts research 
on carbon capture 
and storage and 
concentrating 
solar power 
and works with 
Cambodia, 
Guyana, 
Indonesia, Kenya 
and Tanzania 
to prevent 
deforestation
Brings stakeholders from 
industry (such as energy 
service contractors 
and the manufacturers 
of energy-efficient 
equipment), the public 
sector (municipal and 
city governments) 
and finance (banks 
and lending agencies) 
to conduct climate-
related projects in 40 
metropolitan areas; 
the forestry project 
has also teamed 
up with university 
research institutes and 
government agencies
Energy Through 
Enterprise
E+Co PPP/Hybrid 1997 Bloomfield, 
NJ, US
Focuses on clean 
energy innovation 
by partnering 
MFIs with NGOs 
and the private 
sector through 
eight international 
offices to 
implement 
projects in 20 
developing 
countries
Provides debt and equity 
to support the expansion 
of energy services to rural 
populations around the 
world through the use of 
entrepreneurs
Global Energy 
Efficiency and 
Renewable 
Energy Fund
GEEREF PPP/Hybrid 2004 European 
Investment 
Bank, 
Luxembourg
Created by 
the European 
Commission to 
promote PPPs 
in clean energy 
through private 
equity funds 
to small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises 
in emerging 
economies
Has so far leveraged 
or disbursed about 
US$200m in more 
than 20 projects in the 
developing world
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Small-Scale 
Sustainable 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Fund
S3IDF PPP/Hybrid 2002 Cambridge, 
MA, US
Promotes a 
Social Merchant 
Bank approach 
to help local 
entrepreneurs 
create micro-
enterprises 
that provide 
infrastructure 
services to the 
poor
Has so far built a 
portfolio of almost 200 
small investments and 
associated enterprises in 
India with an additional 
100 projects in the 
pipeline
Solar Electric 
Light Fund
SELF PPP/Hybrid 1990 Washington, 
DC, US
Created to 
empower people 
in developing 
countries to 
escape poverty, 
harnessing energy 
from the sun
Has established more 
than a dozen self-
sustaining solar energy 
projects in 11 countries 
spread across Africa, Asia 
and South America
Acumen Fund AF PPP/Hybrid 2001 New York, 
NY, US
Formed to reduce 
poverty by 
investing in social 
enterprises and 
‘breakthrough’ 
ideas in the 
health, water, 
housing, energy 
and agriculture 
sectors
Approves about US$6m 
per year in social 
enterprise funds for 
microhydro, solar, biogas, 
biomass and lighting 
projects in India, Pakistan 
and East Africa
Global Alliance 
for Clean 
Cookstoves
GACC PPP/Hybrid 2010 Washington, 
DC, US
Committed to 
saving lives, 
improving 
livelihoods and 
addressing 
climate change by 
creating a thriving 
global market 
for fuel-efficient 
cookstoves
Backed by the US 
Department of State, 
the United Nations 
Foundation, and more 
than 200 other partners 
from the public, private 
and non-profit sectors, 
the Alliance has set 
the goal of distributing 
100 million cleaner 
cookstoves by the year 
2020
Green Climate 
Fund
GCF PPP/Hybrid 2010/2011 A fund emerging 
from the 
Conference of 
Parties (COP) 
climate change 
discussions at 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
and Durban, 
South Africa 
to coordinate 
and consolidate 
funding on 
climate change 
mitigation and 
adaptation
Attempts to harmonise 
ongoing global financing 
efforts related to 
energy and transport 
infrastructure (among 
others) from the World 
Bank, the Global 
Environment Facility, 
the Adaptation Fund, 
the Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the G8
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As the table makes clear, global energy governors represent a hodgepodge 
of multiple actors addressing various governance issues related to energy. 
These issues include such disparate topics as:
•	 the	need	for	agreed	rules	to	govern	cross-border	energy	investments	
(eg ECT);
•	 coordination	among	oil-importing	countries	to	ameliorate	the	impact	of	
supply shocks (eg IEA);
•	 addressing	inequities	that	leave	billions	of	people	unable	to	access	energy	
services (multiple organisations of all types, notably the MFIs and many 
of the recently created hybrids);
•	 the	need	to	deal	with	the	environmental	externalities	resulting	from	fossil	
fuel-based energy systems (GEF, IEA, ADB and many others); and
•	 building	 adaptive	 capacity	 and	 resilience	 to	 social	 and	 environmental	
vulnerabilities induced by climate change in least developed and middle-
income countries (GEF, WB, GCF and many others).
There is very little coordination between most of these governors. It would seem 
logical for national governments to have, at a minimum, a coherent strategy 
for dealing with the various organisations of which they are members, yet by 
and large they lack anything approaching a coherent, long-term perspective 
for addressing the full range of energy governance issues.
This incoherence is reflected and amplified at the international level, where 
authority is fragmented and often altogether lacking. The sheer number of 
actors creates a global energy governance scene that appears frenetically busy – 
simply attending just the climate change meetings sponsored by all the relevant 
governors would constitute several full-time jobs. Or, as one study recently 
concluded, the global energy system ‘barely has clearly defined processes, rules 
for regulation, and interference’.6 With energy prices remaining volatile and 
the world making little progress to ameliorate climate change, energy poverty 
and insecurity, it is clear that the current global energy governance model is 
full of sound and fury, yet signifies far too little substance.
Three emerging misconceptions
Understanding the inadequacies of current global energy governance 
requires clearing up some misconceptions that are beginning to appear in 
the literature.
The first is that effective global energy governance is likely to occur (or is 
already occurring) because it has advantages. Governance scholar Kirton tells us 
6 A Goldthau and BK Sovacool, ‘The Uniqueness of the Energy Security, Justice, and 
Governance Problem’ (2012) 41 Energy Policy 232–240.
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that the major economies of the world, through the Group of Eight, have ‘dealt 
with global energy governance in a major and very successful way’.7 Kohl writes 
that institutions such as the IEA have ‘demonstrated that they are adapting to 
the new challenges of a globalized energy work and are cooperating with the 
new consumers on energy security and responses to climate change’.8 Benner 
and his colleagues suggest that ‘over the past 15 years the good and the bad 
have been established as normative terms (along with transparency) in progress 
toward better resource governance’ and ‘the powerful can no longer claim to not 
know the tragic outcomes of bad resource governance’.9 Patt argues that shifts 
to supranational forms of energy governance are ‘very likely’ to occur eventually 
because they offer ‘positive net benefits’.10 He also suggests that investments in 
cleaner forms of energy supply, such as wind and solar, will occur because they 
bring environmental, social and economic benefits. The logic in Patt’s argument 
seems intuitive: if making collective rules on energy is so important, and investing 
in cleaner forms of energy supply pays dividends, why would not actors rush 
to set common frameworks and agreements? And if renewable energy systems 
have so many advantages, why wouldn’t governments and consumers naturally 
embrace them?
However, an enormous social science literature has demonstrated 
conclusively that forms of governance do not necessarily emerge in response to 
all collective action problems whose solutions depend on effective governance 
– starting with Mancur Olson11 and Garrett Hardin12 and skilfully summarised 
by Russell Hardin,13 Elinor Ostrom14 and Thomas Dietz et al.15 The existence 
of positive net benefits is a good starting point for a negotiation, but only that. 
7 John Kirton, ‘The G8 and Global Energy Governance: Past Performance, St Petersburg 
Opportunities’, paper presented at a conference on ‘The World Dimension of Russia’s 
Energy Security’, sponsored by the Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
(MGIMO), Moscow, 21 April 2006, 1.
8 Wilfrid Kohl, ‘Consumer Country Energy Cooperation: The International Energy Agency 
and the Global Energy Order’ in Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte (eds), Global 
Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game (Brookings Institution, 2010), 219.
9 Thorsten Benner, Ricardo Soares de Oliveria and Frederic Kalinke, ‘The Good/Bad 
Nexus in Global Energy Governance’ in Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte (eds), 
Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game (Brookings Institution, 2010), 287–314. 
10 Anthony Patt, ‘Effective Regional Energy Governance – Not Global Environmental 
Governance – is What We Need Right Now for Climate Change’, (2010) 20 Global 
Environmental Change 33–35.
11 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
12 Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243–1248.
13 Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1982).
14 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
15 Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom and Paul Stern, ‘The Struggle to Govern the Commons’ 
(2003) 302(5652) Science 1907–1912. 
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It also matters who would enjoy those positive benefits, who would have to 
pay the costs of providing the governance, whether institutions exist that can 
channel action and whether policy-makers are aware of the potential win-win 
scenarios. If the simple existence of positive net benefits were sufficient, the 
Doha round of trade negotiations would not be mired down, biodiversity 
losses would not be accelerating around the planet and rich countries would 
be pouring serious resources into the establishment of effective health 
systems in their poorer neighbours. Sadly, many supranational problems just 
do not get solved, despite the efforts of a large class of individuals pointing 
out the wide range of positive net benefits that would result. An extensive 
literature examining energy roles at various levels provides strong grounds 
for believing that it is difficult to achieve effective energy governance at 
any level, national or global.16
Consider the example of the G8, which in theory seems ideally suited to 
overcoming collective action problems given its small size, the political power 
of its members and the relatively low costs of negotiation between parties, 
but in practice struggles to govern energy effectively. Lesage and colleagues 
looked at a broader range of energy issues, including those posed by climate 
change, and assessed the performance of the G8 over the past few years.17 
They concluded that it has ‘failed to exert global political leadership’ where 
most needed. Although the G8 has contributed to expanding the scope of 
the IEA and establishing a global organisation to promote energy efficiency, 
overall, the authors emphasised, the G8 has proven incapable of producing 
effective global energy governance because of competing interests within 
the organisation, a dearth of effective monitoring and mechanisms to ensure 
compliance, and its inability to accommodate non-member countries. The G8 
has also been unable to overcome internal divergence on reduction targets 
for greenhouse gases, energy efficiency promotion efforts or a unified stance 
on how to handle Russia. Posing somewhat of a paradox, Van de Graaf and 
Lesage have found that the G8 has been most effective at influencing the 
energy decisions of parties external to the group, such as China, India, Mexico, 
Russia and South Africa, rather than its own members.18 These failures, given 
the absence of alternative overarching global energy governors, leave a void 
that is not easily filled. Or, as Lesage et al put it, ‘although the G8 seem to 
have taken seat in the previously empty cockpit of global energy governance, 
16 Goldthau and Witte (2009) note 5 above; see also AE Florini and BK Sovacool, ‘Bridging 
the Gaps in Global Energy Governance’ (2011) 17(1) Global Governance 57–74.
17 Dries Lesage, Thijs Van de Graaf and Kirsten Westphal, ‘The G8’s Role in Global Energy 
Governance Since the 2005 Gleneagles Summit’ (2009) 15 Global Governance 259–277.
18 Thijs Van de Graaf and Dries Lesage, ‘The International Energy Agency After 35 
Years: Reform Needs and Institutional Adaptability’ (2009) 4(3) Review of International 
Organizations 293–317.
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the overall results are somewhat disappointing, due to the lack of concrete 
targets, the limited attention for demand control and energy saving, the non-
binding nature of commitments, the ensuring problems with compliance, 
and the fact that… little money has been pledged’.19
The belief that investments in cleaner energy systems will occur merely 
because they would be beneficial, also part of Patt’s argument, contradicts 
scores of studies examining the barriers to innovation and investment 
at every stage of the commercialisation and deployment process. The 
Interlaboratory Working Group documented dozens of barriers to 
cleaner energy technologies including misplaced incentives, inconsistent 
regulations and information and market failures.20 Painuly surveyed a host 
of barriers and failures to global renewable energy penetration, highlighting 
in particular the problem of missing market infrastructure and lack of 
knowledge.21 Beck and Martinot have noted that subsidies for conventional 
forms of energy, high initial capital costs, imperfect capital markets, lack 
of skills or information, poor market acceptance, technology prejudice, 
financing risks and uncertainties, high transaction costs and a variety of 
regulatory and institutional factors prevent optimal levels of renewable 
energy investment from occurring.22 We interviewed more than 180 experts 
working for utilities, in government agencies, and the national laboratories 
and identified 38 non-technical barriers to the deployment of distributed 
generation, renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies.23 Brown 
et al examined a selection of persistent financial, market, information and 
intellectual property barriers.24
Indeed, there has never been a systematic approach to developing global 
energy governance. Instead, rules and institutions emerge ad hoc, driven 
19 Lesage, Van de Graaf and Westphal, note 17 above and ‘G8 + 5 Collaboration on 
Energy Efficiency and IPEEC: Shortcut to a Sustainable Future?’ (2010) 38(11) Energy 
Policy 6419–6427.
20 Interlaboratory Working Group, ‘Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future’ (Oak Ridge, 
TN; Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Berkeley, CA; Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory, 2000), ORNL/CON-476 and LBNL-44029.
21 JP Painuly, ‘Barriers to Renewable Energy Penetration, a Framework for Analysis’ 
(2001) 24 Renewable Energy 73–89.
22 F Beck and E Martinot, ‘Renewable Energy Policies and Barriers’ in Cutler Cleveland 
(ed), Encyclopedia of Energy (Academic Press/Elsevier Science, 2004).
23 See BK Sovacool, The Dirty Energy Dilemma: What’s Blocking Clean Power in the United States 
(Westport: Praegar, 2008); BK Sovacool, ‘The Cultural Barriers to Renewable Energy 
in the United States’ (2009) 31(4) Technology in Society 365–373; and BK Sovacool, 
‘Rejecting Renewables: The Socio-technical Impediments to Renewable Electricity in 
the United States’ (2009) 37(11) Energy Policy 4500–4513.
24 Marilyn A Brown, Sharon (Jess) Chandler, Melissa V Lapsa and Benjamin K Sovacool, 
Carbon Lock-In: Barriers to the Deployment of Climate Change Mitigation Technologies (Oak 
Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2007/124, November 2008).
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by crises rather than by coherent strategies seeking broad benefits. The IEA 
was created only after the oil shocks of the early 1970s.25 The European 
Commission formed a panel looking at energy security only after disputes 
between Belarus, Germany and Ukraine and Russia over natural gas created 
fuel shortages and higher prices.26 The United States placed energy security 
issues at the forefront of its foreign policy only after Hurricane Katrina 
disrupted oil and gas imports and refineries.27
One final reason that effective global energy governance often does not 
occur is because it is a source of conflict, not cooperation, meaning actors 
often get stuck in the agenda and negotiation stages, and never reach 
implementation. Westphal has noted that energy governance represents 
a contested domain between power-based geopolitical concerns and 
multilateral and cooperative governance.28 She argues that the history of 
energy production is a narrative of ‘permanent conflict’ and tensions between 
consumers and producers. Consumers of energy want competition among 
producers to lower prices, producers want consumers to be diffuse so they 
lack the collective bargaining power to challenge control over production. 
Other conflicts over energy governance can occur because of resource 
scarcity, geopolitical power moves and the diverging influence of consumer 
countries. Strong calls for large national energy champions, big enough 
to compete in the global marketplaces, are often at odds with a desire to 
enhance international market competition based on agreed rules. As she 
concludes: ‘What has become apparent (again) over recent years is the fact 
that energy governance takes place in a field of tension between governance 
based on market and institutions (and the rule of law) on the one hand, and 
state-centered, power-based geopolitics on the other.’29
A second misconception is that various regional or multilateral successes 
in governance necessarily may provide models that can be exported to other 
regions or topics. Patt, for example, extrapolates from European experience 
to imply that it may offer a model for energy governance around the world. 
Patt says: ‘nation states have agreed to be bound by the decisions of a 
supranational organization, because they see that it is to their benefit – or 
the benefit of their citizens – to do so.’ 30 Kohl states that European Union 
(EU) countries ‘have done well at integrating energy and climate goals in its 
25 Florini, note 3 above.
26 Lesage, Van de Graaf and Westphal, note 19 above.
27 Karoly Nagy, ‘The Additional Benefits of Setting Up and Energy Security Centre’ (2009) 
34 Energy 1715–1720.
28 Kirsten Westphal, ‘Energy Policy Between Multilateral Governance and Geopolitics: 
Whither Europe?’ [2006] Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 44–63.
29 Ibid 58.
30 Patt, note 10 above.
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program’ and ‘set a bold example for the world’, again implying that their 
methods of cooperation should be replicated.31
Yet, as Gruber has shown, less powerful governments frequently sign up 
to such organisations or agreements not because they wish to be bound, but 
because they can’t afford the costs of remaining outside the only club around 
(costs that may include the withholding of aid flows if they refuse to join).32 The 
rules that are made by and for the powerful may work over the short term, but 
they do not form a solid basis for long-term systems of international cooperation. 
The lack of progress in recent years in international cooperation on everything 
from trade to climate to nuclear non-proliferation reflects a fundamental 
weakness in the existing institutions – their legitimacy is questioned by rising 
powers that increasingly insist on having a meaningful say. Far from seeing a 
meaningful shift from national sovereignty to supranational decision-making, 
we are seeing an increasing insistence on sovereign prerogatives by countries, 
such as China, India and Brazil, that can no longer be ignored. As Victor and 
Yueh conclude, ‘although energy commodities and technologies are traded 
globally, the system for governing the markets for these important goods is 
fragmented and increasingly impotent’.33
Some, like Patt, contend that the ‘blossoming of multilateral environmental 
agreements’ could in time alleviate many pressing energy and climate 
problems, and he points to the Montreal Protocol as the ‘most successful’ 
of these. He also states that ‘global environmental governance is here, and 
growing stronger’.34 We agree that the Montreal Protocol is an exemplar 
among global environmental statutes, but it is about the only truly successful 
example. Further, we also question the efficacy of global environmental 
governance. Instances of failures are far more commonplace, and well-known 
cases include the 1992 Convention of Biological Diversity, which has not 
slowed rates of biodiversity loss, species extinction and habitat destruction;35 
the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, which has not halted the 
collapse of global fisheries;36 and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which, as even 
Patt noted, has not slowed emissions of global greenhouse gases.37
31 Kohl, note 8 above, 200.
32 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions 
(Princeton University Press, 2000).
33 David G Victor and Linda Yueh, ‘The New Energy Order’ (2010) 89(1) Foreign Affairs 74.
34 Patt, note 10 above. 
35 Carl Folke, CS Holling and Charles Perrings, ‘Biological Diversity, Ecosystems, and the 
Human Scale’ (1996) 6(4) Ecological Applications 1018–1024.
36 Ransom Myers and Boris Worm, ‘Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish 
Communities’ (2003) 423 Nature 280–283.
37 See J Reilly, R Prinn, J Harnisch et al, ‘Multi-Gas Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol’ 
(1999) 401 Nature 549–555; David G Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton University Press, 2001); David G Victor, 
‘Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests, 
and Institutions’ (2006) 6(3) Global Environmental Politics 90–105.
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Indeed, it is useful to consider the reasons that the Montreal Protocol is 
so unusual in its relative success. Analysts usually point to three fundamental 
explanations. First, the Protocol dealt with a narrowly defined class of 
chemicals produced in only a handful of countries, which meant that the 
number of key stakeholders whose interests had to be addressed was small 
and negotiations were manageable. Secondly, moving away from production 
of the chemicals did not require substantial disruption of a significant 
number of vested interests or significant lifestyles changes on the part of the 
public – indeed, major producers quickly discovered that they could quite 
profitably move to substitutes, and ‘side payments’ could be relatively small. 
Thirdly, once the ‘hole’ in the ozone layer over Antarctica was discovered, 
the issue could be readily framed in publicly appealing terms – everyone 
could understand the danger of a hole in the sky. Few of the challenges 
facing global energy governance are so relatively simple to address, given 
the enormous vested interests in and complexity of the existing systems.38
A third misconception is that regional energy governance is urgently 
needed rather than global energy governance. Patt makes this argument 
most compellingly.39 He states that since global energy may happen but 
only eventually (owing to barriers to negotiation, the lack of trust among 
different countries, and the perceived importance of national sovereignty), 
we need regional energy governance to avoid dangerous climate change. 
Patt also believes that to catalyse investments in cleaner forms of energy such 
as wind turbines, concentrated solar power (CSP) and batteries, regional 
integration will be instrumental. Finally, Patt suggests that, drawing on the 
strength of the institutions of the EU and similar bodies, it might be easier to 
get regional energy governance than global energy governance. This type of 
regional energy governance may then be a good prerequisite for meaningful 
global energy governance. In sum, Patt is suggesting that the difficulties of 
meaningful global energy governance are so great that it might be good to 
start down that path at a regional scale with the EU, since it already has a 
track record of states benefiting from relinquishing some national sovereignty 
on important issues.
But Patt also admits, correctly, that even the EU, by far the most advanced 
example of regional cooperation the world has ever known, has struggled to 
achieve meaningful cooperation on energy issues. And even if the EU itself 
had developed excellent systems of energy governance, it is highly unlikely 
that those systems would work in the very different contexts of other regions. 
Within Asia in particular, applying regional models of energy governance 
simply will not work. Asia has only rudimentary institutions for cooperation, 
38 Florini, note 3 above.
39 Patt, note 10 above.
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making it unlikely that cooperation will occur on important issues, especially 
energy. China, India, Japan and Korea have a troubled history resulting in a 
dearth of trust among them. Nor is it clear whether they have fundamentally 
similar interests on energy and climate questions. Cooperation on large-
scale, transnational energy infrastructure in South-East Asia remains scant 
owing to lack of technical expertise, inconsistent regulatory frameworks, 
weak political leadership, tensions over the pricing of energy resources and 
exports and pervasive mistrust and internal suspicion between members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and external suspicion of China, 
Japan and the United States.40 Table 3 portrays how these barriers crisscross 
technical, economic, legal, political and environmental dimensions.
Table 3: Barriers to regional energy governance in South-East Asia
Technical Economic Legal Political Social Environmental
Infrastructure 
construction 
and operation
Uncertainty 
surrounding 
energy reserves
Inconsistent 
regulatory 
frameworks
Contests over 
sovereignty
Poor 
participatory 
mechanisms
Land 
degradation
Unknown future 
energy demand
Unclear protection 
of property rights
Diplomatic 
tensions
Lack of 
transparency
Accidents and 
spills
Capital intensity State control of 
markets
Protectionism Relocation, 
resettlement and 
human rights 
concerns
Greenhouse gas 
emissions and 
climate change
Financing Weak 
mechanisms for 
dispute settlement
Lack of 
sustained 
leadership
Returns on 
investment
Disagreements 
over prices and 
tariffs
Also, from a technological standpoint, large-scale and regional energy 
systems present enormous, possibly insuperable challenges to effective 
governance. To an extent regional scales of investment will be needed, 
substituting oil-, coal- and natural gas-fired power plants with renewable 
ones will require thousands of gigawatts of installed capacity. But we do 
not want to replicate all renewable energy systems in the image of fossil 
fuels. Large-scale energy systems, renewable or not, are much more 
difficult to govern. They tend to be more prone to cost over-runs. They 
present grave security risks because taking down one facility can cause 
cascading power outages. They rely on inefficient and brittle transmission 
networks prone to attack and accident. And they are amenable only 
40 Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘Energy Policy and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The History, 
Challenges, and Implications of the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Network (TAGP)’ 
(2009) 37(6) Energy Policy 2356–2367.
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to rich countries or large corporate conglomerates with the necessary 
capital to finance construction, and have slower learning curves due to 
their capital intensity.41 Consider the example of building concentrating 
solar power stations in Northern Africa that would export electricity 
to European markets: a single terrorist attack, accident, or severe 
weather event could effortlessly disrupt the high-voltage transmission 
lines carrying electricity between the continents, and distance of the 
transmission network would entail considerable efficiency losses.
Far more nimble and effective are small-scale, decentralised, 
modular renewable energy systems such as solar panels, run-of-the-river 
hydroelectric dams and residential wind turbines. These can be installed 
practically anywhere, in practically any configuration, and owned and 
operated by anyone, especially homeowners, cooperatives, hotels, 
hospitals and small enterprises. These ‘bottom-up’ systems improve 
energy security through diversification, provide ancillary services to the 
electricity grid rather than eroding its efficiency, and produce energy 
close to its point of consumption, improving reliability.
Many of the most successful examples of rapid diffusion, moreover, 
involve not grand, expensive, hundred megawatt power stations but 
small-scale systems with quick learning curves, such as cookstoves in 
China,42 solar panels in Kenya43 and biogas digesters in Bangladesh.44 
To be sure, both forms of technology – the big, centralised renewable 
power stations and the small, independent systems – will be needed 
in the electricity system of the future, but the latter cannot be done 
at a regional scale. They can and should only be done at the scale of 
individuals, neighbourhoods and cities.
Conclusion
To be sure, global energy governance is a complex topic, weaving 
together energy technologies, rules and actors engaged in a variety of 
different aspects of energy production and use. A robust dialogue on the 
41 Amory Lovins, E Kyle Datta, Thomas Feiler, Andre Lehmann et al, Small is Profitable: 
The Hidden Benefits of Making Electrical Resources the Right Size (Snowmass: Rocky Moun-
tain Institute, 2002); Jane Summerton and Ted K Bradshaw, ‘Towards a Dispersed 
Electrical System: Challenges to the Grid’ (January/February 1991), Energy Policy .
42 KR Smith, Gu Shuhua, Huang Kun and Qiu Daxiong, ‘One Hundred Million Improved 
Cookstoves in China: How Was It Done?’ (1993) 21(6) World Development 941–961.
43 R Acker and D Kammen, ‘The Quiet (Energy) Revolution: The Diffusion of 
Photovoltaic Power Systems in Kenya’ (1996) 24 Energy Policy 81–111.
44 MMG Hossain, ‘Improved Cookstove and Biogas Programs in Bangladesh’ (2003) 7(2) 
Energy for Sustainable Development 97–100.
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nature, scope and challenges of energy and climate governance needs 
to occur. But more nuanced and careful assessment will be needed, and 
misconceptions abandoned, if we are truly to respond to the governance 
issues induced by deteriorating energy security and growing emissions 
of greenhouse gases.
One promising area of inquiry, an example of thinking creatively about 
global energy governance, comes from the work of the Nobel Laureate 
Elinor Ostrom. Ostrom suggests that no single scale but a blending 
of scales, something she calls polycentrism, creates optimal forms of 
governance.45 Polycentric approaches imply that the sharing of power 
between numerous scales of governance must be seamlessly interwoven, 
resulting in a ‘polycentricity’ or ‘nestedness’ that involves multiple 
authorities and overlapping jurisdictions. The justification behind 
polycentric approaches is that conventional forms of governance such as 
top-down centralised control, bottom-up decentralised control and even 
free market privatisation have inescapable flaws in isolation.46 Evidence 
has begun to emerge that polycentric and ‘networked’ approaches, not 
purely regional or local ones, can encourage plurality, promote dialogue, 
ensure redundancy and enhance accountability needed to respond to 
energy and climate dilemmas.47 Here, then, relying on regional scales 
of energy governance alone would ignore the benefits of having them 
interact with other scales and actors.
Another promising area of inquiry concerns hybrid and partnership 
forms of energy governance. The prevalence of PPPs on the global energy 
scene – by far the fastest growing form of governance, and the most 
frequent type catalogued by our cursory assessment of global governors 
in Table 2 – suggests that they may be succeeded where other governance 
structures fail. Partnerships seem well suited to address various energy 
challenges and insecurities given their ability to attract private capital 
investment, increase efficient use of resources and maximise budgetary 
assets. They can, when properly structured, mobilise private capital 
and create synergies to accomplish public goals and needs; facilitate 
45 Elinor Ostrom, ‘The Governance Challenge: Matching Institutions to the Structure of 
Socio-Ecological Systems’ in Simon Levin (ed), The Princeton Guide to Ecology (Trenton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
46 BK Sovacool, ‘An International Comparison of Four Polycentric Approaches to Climate 
and Energy Governance’ (2011) 39(6) Energy Policy 3832–3844.
47 See Ostrom, note 45 above; Adrian Smith, ‘Emerging In Between: The Multi-Level 
Governance of Renewable Energy in the English Regions’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 
6266–6280; Krister P Andersson and Elinor Ostrom, ‘Analyzing Decentralized Resource 
Regimes from a Polycentric Perspective’ (2008) 41 Policy Sciences 71–93; and Ora-Om 
Poocharoen and BK Sovacool, ‘Exploring the Challenges of Energy and Resources 
Network Governance’ (2012) 42 Energy Policy 409–418.
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more efficient use of resources and improved service delivery; reduce 
corruption; and improve stakeholder engagement.48
A third promising area encompasses regulatory harmonisation and 
institutional coordination. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
created the umbrella group ‘United Nations-Energy’ in 2010 to better 
synchronise efforts previously spread across more than 20 separate internal 
programmes, departments and divisions. UN-Energy has been especially 
involved in managing activities related to its declaration of 2012 as the 
‘International Year for Sustainable Energy for All’. This initiative seeks to 
engage governments, companies and other civil society actors to achieve 
three goals by 2030: universal access to modern energy services, reducing 
global energy intensity by 40 per cent and increasing renewable energy 
use globally to 30 per cent of total primary energy supply.49 The Global 
Alliance for Cookstoves was created with support by the United Nations 
and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in order to harmonise attempts 
to distribute fuel-efficient stoves across hundreds of private, public and 
non-profit actors.50 The Green Climate Fund created at the Copenhagen 
climate change discussions in 2010 endeavours to consolidate six separate 
large-scale sources of financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
These are all relatively successful attempts to address the fragmentation and 
incoherence often plaguing the global energy governance environment.
A final promising approach may be to improve transparency and disclosure 
substantially in the energy sector. Efforts at global energy governance must 
contend with an extraordinary degree of opacity. In the oil sector, for 
example, where state-owned firms control 80 per cent of reserves, publicly 
available data on the actual extent of those reserves are known to be highly 
questionable. Numerous experiments using disclosure mechanisms to 
improve various aspects of global energy governance are under way, such as 
48 See Klaus Felsinger, The Public-Private Partnership Handbook (Manila: Asian Development 
Bank, 2010); Marian Moszoro and Paweł Gąsiorowski, ‘Optimal Capital Structure of 
Public-Private Partnerships’, International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/08/1 (New 
York: IMF, January 2008); J Broadbent and R Laughlin, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: An 
Introduction’ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 332–341; 
M Gerrard, ‘Public-Private Partnerships’ (2001) 38(3) Finance and Development ; P Grout, 
‘The Economics of Private Finance Initiatives’ (1997) 13(4) Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 53–66; P Grout, ‘Public and Private Sector Discount Rates in Public-Private 
Partnerships’ (2003) 113 The Economic Journal 62–68; P Vaillancourt-Rosenau, Public-
Private Policy Partnerships (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000).
49 United Nations Foundation, ‘2012 International Year of Sustainable Energy for All’ 
(2011), available at www.sustainableenergyforall.org/about.
50 Matthew Lee, ‘Clean Cookstoves: Hillary Clinton Fights Cooking Deaths In Developing 
World’ (20 July 2011), available at www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/20/clean-cook-
stoves-hillary-clinton-cooking-deaths_n_904499.html.
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the Joint Oil Data Initiative of the International Energy Forum, the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative and the Carbon Disclosure Project run by a 
consortium of large institutional investors.51 Such experiments all suffer from 
significant flaws in their current youthful incarnations, but they also hold 
promise for bringing about significant improvements in the management 
of global energy problems.
In short, we need concepts and analysis such as these – polycentrism, 
partnerships, coordination and disclosure, as well as others – that recognise 
the dilemmas of collective action and account for non-technical barriers, 
as well as models that do not presume that European experience will apply 
homogenously to communities around the world. We need assessments 
that confront the reality behind the failure of international environmental 
treaties, and an appreciation for small, decentralised, residential energy 
systems alongside dedication to large, centralised, commercial ones; and a 
willingness to promote approaches to energy and climate issues that blend 
local, regional and global scales of governance. Only when these conditions 
start to occur can the badly needed benefits of global energy governance 
begin to be realised.
51 Ann Florini and Saleena Saleem, ‘Information Disclosure in Global Energy Governance’, 
Global Policy: Special Issue on Global Energy Governance, September 2011, 144–154.
